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Interview with Mohammad Eshaq about the hunt for Osama bin Laden

After the TRODPINT mission was scuttled, the CIA searched for another way to target Osama bin Laden and decided to work with the anti-Taliban forces of the Northern Alliance (aka the United Front). In the fall of 1999, a team of agency operatives helicoptered into Afghanistan to have a meeting with the NA's de facto leader, a Tajik named Ahmad Shah Masood. Nicknamed "the Lion of the Panjshir," Masood was hero to many Afghans for his long brutal struggle against the Soviets. But he never had a close relationship with US operatives because of allegations of human-rights abuses and drug smuggling by his forces and because the Pakistani government considered him an enemy. The CIA teams met with Masood and his NA men several times but were never able to cooperate to successfully kill or capture bin Laden, partly because US intelligence was forbidden by the administration from getting involved in the war against the Taliban.

On September 9, 2001, a team of Arab assassins managed to get into the same room with Masood by posing as journalists who wanted an on-camera interview. Their camera, packed with explosives, detonated and killed the guerilla leader. Two days later America was hit.

Mohammad Eshaq was the representative of the Northern Alliance in Washington, DC and a close friend and ally of Ahmad Shah Masood. He answered our questions from his office in Kabul.

Kuma\War: How long have you known Masood? Was he an important ally for the US to have in trying to catch bin Laden?

Eshaq: I have known Ahmad Shah Masood since 1973. I cannot describe him as an ally of the US, but they had the same enemy. Bin Laden and the Taliban wanted to defeat Masood, and the US accused bin Laden of terrorism. It was logical for the US to help the enemy of his enemy, but Washington did not consider bin Laden such a big threat to make them ready to get involved in Afghanistan once again.

Kuma\War: There are media accounts that the CIA attempted to coordinate action with the United Front in order to catch bin Laden in the years before 9/11. Do you remember these meetings? How serious was the effort?

Eshaq: CIA officers came to meet with the commander. At the start they wanted to buy back the Stinger missiles (Ed. Note: The Stinger missiles sold to the mujahedin to defeat Soviet air power during the 1980s were still floating around Afghanistan ten years later. The CIA was given authorization to make contact with local warlords to buy them back.) Later they were trying to get information about bin Laden, but the US Government wanted to deal with the bin Laden issue without getting involved in actions that seemed against the Taliban. This was the core of the problem. For Masood it was impossible to separate bin Laden from The Taliban. US officials were concerned about terrorism but not to such an extent to make them ready to cooperate with Masood in a meaningful way.

Kuma\War: Why wasn't the US successful in catching bin Laden before 9/11?

Eshaq: Perhaps the US government did not see him as a big threat and did not plan well to capture him. Perhaps the US listened too much to the Pakistanis who always tried to protect the Taliban. Separating the bin Laden issue from the Taliban was a wrong judgment on the part of the US government. It was after September 11th that Americans began deal with both issues at the same time. Catching a terrorist is not an easy job. Even now he is at large.

Kuma\War: Why was the American intelligence community afraid of getting involved with your group?

Eshaq: US intelligence had little cooperation with Masood even during the Soviet invasion. At that time they followed the rules set by Pakistanis. Pakistanis did not like Masood because he was an independent-minded person. The CIA supported Hikmatyar, an archrival of Masood because he was Pakistani favorite. I think the CIA had accepted the Pakistani negative propaganda against Masood. With such a history it might not have been easy for them to support Masood when he resisted the Taliban. Masood understood the importance of US involvement in bringing peace to Afghanistan and tried to draw Washington’s attention to the tragedy of Afghanistan and its negative implications to stability in the region. But the US government did not listen. As a representative of Masood in Washington, I was told by a US official in 2000 that Masood was no different from Mullah Omar and small diplomatic steps taken by US against the Taliban were not intended to help him.

Kuma\War: When you read media accounts of al Qaeda and the Taliban, is there anything they consistently get wrong?

Eshaq: Ghost Wars (Ed. Note: this book is by Washington Post editor Steve Coll) has dealt with the issue in a detailed way. Its description is not perfect but much better than others though I think the book is too soft on the CIA. The US media did not cover the events in Afghanistan in a serious way before September 11th and now they are reporting emotionally and with an angle of patriotism. Lack of their involvement in the past makes their reports very shallow and to fill that gap they turn to UN “Afghan experts”, US officials, and NGOs who are promoting their agendas. Very few objective reports come out these days about the situation in Afghanistan.