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Mission 2 - Tactical Considerations
Operation Anaconda

By Sgt. Dan Snyder (USMC)

It looked like a giant game of 'whack a mole'.

If there is anything that is peculiar about this operation, it is the divergent views of ambush held by the combatants. Due to the historical success the Taliban had in this valley, they thought that pre-zeroed mortar fire would make for an effective ambush against the light infantry patrols that would be probing for them. They thought time was on their side, and the attackers would lose inertia as losses mounted.

The Allies thought that the fighters would try to leave the valley as pressure mounted - hence the US forces lining up primarily as blocking forces. The U.S. goal in this combat was not to control a region or people in a region, but to exterminate them. And by evicting the local villagers, the Taliban simplified the rules of engagement for the allied forces.

But for the Allies, Tora Bora showed the limitations of air power against a logistically uncomplicated enemy. There is nothing for us to interdict or disrupt. Any contact with a cellular style organization like terrorists is a front line confrontation. Therefore, the aerial bombardment acted as old fashioned world war one style artillery on an entrenched enemy, who was highly motivated.

But hunter killer teams were key, here. They no doubt enjoyed a high success rate as they observed the tendency of the Taliban fighters to enter spider holes during bombing runs and reemerge to taunt and harass after. But what the aerial attacks couldn't hit, the hunter killers could - and did.

It looked like a giant game of 'whack a mole'.